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‘Remember that name, Fakhrizadeh’, said Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu in 2018. On 27 November 2020, the world remembered. Mohsen
Fakhrizadeh, a man who Israel and the United States have long suspected to be
the leading figure in an ostensibly secret Iranian nuclear weapons project, was
killed while travelling with his car near Tehran. Apparently, he was a victim of
remotely activated machine gun fire and explosives. In a letter addressed to the
United Nations, Iran’s Ambassador to the UN spoke of ‘serious indications of Israeli
responsibility’. While the responsibility for the attack is indeed still unclear, this post
examines the incident on the premise that a State (other than Iran) is responsible
for the death of Mr. Fakhrizadeh through the lens of human rights law and the jus
ad bellum. In line with Agnes Callamard’s view that the killing took place outside an
armed conflict, international humanitarian law will not be applied to the case at hand.
The assassination of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh under international human rights
law
Like any human being, Mr. Fakhrizadeh enjoyed the right to life. The killing of a
person by a State may constitute an arbitrary deprivation of life and violate Article
6(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Assuming
another State was responsible for Mr. Fakhrizadeh’s death, the question of the
ICCPR’s application ratione loci arises. Article 2(1) ICCPR stipulates that a party
must respect and ensure the Covenant’s rights to ‘all individuals within its territory
and subject to its jurisdiction’. Mr. Fakhrizadeh was assassinated in Iran and not
within the territory of another State. But did any other State exercise jurisdiction over
him at the time of the attack?
The notion of ‘jurisdiction’ in the case of Mr. Fakhrizadeh
‘Jurisdiction’ often parallels territory, but the term is not necessarily limited in this
regard. The ICCPR is generally applicable to extraterritorial situations. (cf. Wall
Advisory Opinion, para. 109) A person is subject to a State’s jurisdiction if that
State exercises power or effective control over the person’s enjoyment of the right
to life (cf. General Comment 36, para. 63). The European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR) handles the notion of ‘jurisdiction’ restrictively. For example, applying the
notoriously narrow reading of Bankovi#, the killing of Mr. Fakhrizadeh with remote
machine gun fire and explosives would not establish a jurisdictional link. However,
as the British High Court of Justice convincingly put it when dealing with the scope
of jurisdiction under the European Convention of Human Rights: ‘Using force to kill is
indeed the ultimate exercise of physical control over another human being’ (a legal
position endorsed by the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary
executions). In a more recent judgment dealing with the killing of an individual by
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State actors, the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR did not need to tackle its much
criticized Bankovi# decision or expand the Al-Skeini understanding of the exceptional
character of the extraterritorial exercise of ‘jurisdiction’ by deciding whether the firing
of bullets and kinetic effects alone might suffice to establish jurisdiction.
A broader understanding of the ‘power or effective control’ dogma
The Human Rights Committee’s (HRC) 2018 General Comment on the right
to life hints towards another possible way to apply the ICCPR to the case at
hand, broadening but not abandoning its ‘power or effective control’ approach to
jurisdiction. It referred to a reasonably foreseeable ‘impact’ of a State’s activities on
the right to life of a person. This should be seen in the light of the negative dimension
of Article 6(1) ICCPR, i.e. a State’s duty to respect life. The incident evidently had a
grave and foreseeable impact on the life of Mr. Fakhrizadeh. Against the notion of a
foreseeable and direct impact of a State’s action, ‘jurisdiction’ of another State would
be established, rendering the ICCPR applicable ratione loci. While this interpretation
is rooted in a progressive reading of the HRC’s General Comments, it should be
noted that the Committee’s understanding of ‘power or effective control’ over an
individual is broader than the way the ECtHR regards jurisdiction by virtue of State
agents exercising ‘control and authority’ over an individual.
Mr. Fakhrizadeh’s killing as a violation of Article 6(1) ICCPR?
A deprivation of life violates Article 6(1) ICCPR if it is arbitrary. For example, the
arbitrariness of the act would be excluded if the killing of Mr. Fakhrizadeh served
as a strictly necessary protective act against an imminent threat to life. Even on the
premises that a) the Iranian program to develop a nuclear missile warhead existed
and that b) Mr. Fakhrizadeh was the head of the program, it is not indicated that the
completion of the weapon was close. Thus, even if Mr. Fakhrizadeh’s activities were
malignant, it is unlikely that they posed an imminent threat to someone’s life that
would justify the use of lethal force. Due to the absence of evidence and considering
the high standards for a non-arbitrary killing, his assassination probably was an
arbitrary deprivation of life.
Use of force, self-defense and self-defense against the use of force
The assassination of Mr. Fakhrizadeh also poses questions under the jus ad
bellum. He was killed with gunfire and explosives – weapons in the most classical
understanding of the term ‘force’. However, some argue that ‘very small incidents
lie below’ the threshold of Art. 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations (UNCh),
highlighting ‘for instance the targeted killings of single individuals’. Even following
this view that micro invasive acts of ‘armed force’ do not meet an alleged gravity
threshold of Article 2(4) UNCh altogether, the killing of Mr. Fakhrizadeh was not
a small scale act. This is due to the UNCh’s aim to comprehensively ban the use
of arms as a means of inter-State policy. Mr. Fakhrizadeh, an eminent scientist of
the Iranian Government, was killed in what appears to have been a meticulously
planned attack – especially given that he was one of the best protected Iranians.
Most likely, the perpetrators (in this scenario agents willfully sent by a third State) did
not target Mr. Fakhrizadeh in his private capacity but intended to deliberately target
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Iran itself. The attack aimed to profoundly and coercively (by virtue of ‘armed force’)
influence Iran’s (scientific) policy for years to come. This differentiates this case from
the targeted killings of terrorists or non-State actors, which are often not primarily
aimed at substantially damaging other States. In conclusion, if Article 2(4) UNCh
contains a certain gravity threshold, due to the deliberate nature of the use of force it
would be met.
Self-defense against a nuclear weapon?
Pursuant to Article 51 UNCh, a State may resort to the use force in self-defense
against an ‘armed attack’. In light of the Webster Formula, a State may resort to
force in an exercise of preventive self-defense against an armed attack that has
not yet occurred but which is imminent, i.e. if there is ‘a necessity of self-defense,
instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation’.
Whatever the exact status of an Iranian nuclear missile program, the killing of its
alleged head took place at a time when the prospect of a nuclear weapon, let alone
Iran’s specific intention to attack was still more than diffuse. In fact, even if Iran were
already in possession of a bomb, this alone would not trigger the right to self-defense
by virtue of an imminent armed attack. (O’Connell/El Molla, 315, 319) Any legal
figures such as the infamous preemptive self-defense doctrine, which aim to extend
the right to self-defense beyond an ‘imminent’ attack, should be dismissed. Not only
have most States – rightly – rejected this approach, but this understanding also
contravenes the object and purpose of the UNCh and its Article 39. Self-defense
before an ‘armed attack’ should only be possible in narrow circumstances, i.e. if the
threat of another State’s attack is pressingly feasible. Thus, States were unable to
invoke self-defense.
Would a reaction of Iran be covered by the right to self-defense?
Iran’s President Rouhani announced that Iran would respond to the killing. His
statement possibly hints at the use of force by Iran. It is questionable whether
such an act would be covered by Iran’s right to self-defense. First, while, Iran’s
Ambassador to the UN spoke of ‘serious indications of Israeli responsibility’,
‘indications’ hardly live up to the burden of proof for the party invoking a right to self-
defense. (cf. Oil Platforms, paras. 50-64). Second, the assassination must have
been of a certain scale and effects (cf. Nicaragua, Merits, paras. 191, 195) to meet
the threshold of an ‘armed attack’. Arguably, the killing of a single person does not
constitute a grave form of the use of force, comparable to those enumerated in the
Definition of Aggression, which in turn provides indications as to the threshold of
an ‘armed attack’. Thus, Iran may only respond with non-forcible countermeasures.
On a side note: In his separate opinion in the Oil Platforms Case, Judge Simma
prominently argued for a possible ‘defensive military action “short of” full-scale
self-defense’ in instances of an unlawful use of force ‘short of’ an armed attack.
Regardless whether this reflects lex lata, the ICJ held that self-defense warrants
only necessary measures. For example, an Iranian strike in kind would be purely
retaliatory in nature. It would neither be an answer to an ‘imminent’ armed attack nor
would such be necessary to respond to an (alleged) armed attack.
Conclusion
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It remains a thought game whether Mr. Fakhrizadeh’s assassination violated
international law. The factual uncertainty makes it impossible to give a definite
answer. But if Israel – or any other State – was indeed responsible for his death,
there are strong arguments to see this as a violation of human rights law and the
jus ad bellum. In any event, Iran will uphold its nuclear energy ambitions and the
scenario of an atomic bomb in the hands of the Islamic Republic continues to hang
over the region like a Sword of Damocles. For now, the alleged Iranian mastermind
behind the State’s nuclear weapons ambitions is dead, leaving us with a lot of
questions as to the (il)legality of his death under international law.
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